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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 The lawsuit that underlies these appeals arises out of 
the decade-long efforts of a class of incarcerated prisoners to 
ameliorate the severe overcrowding and harsh conditions existing 
in the prisons maintained and supervised by the City of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (hereafter Philadelphia or City).  The 
Philadelphia defendants have not contested the need for 
substantial and meaningful improvements.  Indeed, they entered 
into two consent decrees and stipulated revisions thereto in 
which they agreed to make massive improvements and agreed to have 
the district court supervise the steps they planned to implement 
those improvements.  It is also not contested that Philadelphia 
did not meet the deadlines for some of the obligations it 
undertook in the consent decrees and stipulations.  Ultimately, 
because of Philadelphia's failure to comply, the district court 
entered the series of orders which are the subject of these 
appeals.1 
                     
 
    1  In prior appeals we reversed the district court's 
dismissal of the case on res judicata and abstention grounds; 
Harris v. Pernsley (Harris I), 755 F.2d 338 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 965 (1985), and twice affirmed the district 
court's denial of the District Attorney's motion to intervene in 
this proceeding.  See Harris v. Pernsley (Harris II), 820 F.2d 
592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987); Harris v. 
Reeves (Harris III), 946 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992). 
  
 Before us in this opinion is the City of Philadelphia's 
appeal from the order of October 5, 1993 imposing on it  
stipulated penalties totalling $584,000 (No. 93-1997), the order 
of October 28, 1993 directing production of the Facilities Audit 
(No. 93-2116), and the order of November 1, 1993 dismissing the 
City's Motion to Modify the December 30, 1986 Decree and the 
March 11, 1991 Decree as a contempt sanction for the City's 
failure to timely submit the Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan 
by the dates previously stipulated (No. 93-2117).   
 These appeals were consolidated for argument with three 
related appeals.  The appeal from the injunction entered by the 
district court governing the occupancy and conditions of 
confinement of the City's newly constructed prison facility 
denominated the Alternative and Special Detention Central Unit 
(No. 93-2034) was remanded to the district court because the 
issues raised by the City on appeal had not been raised by it in 
the district court.  See Harris v. City of Philadelphia (Harris 
IV), 35 F.3d 840 (3d Cir. l994).  Still pending and the subject 
of separate opinions filed today are the appeal from an order 
adjudicating the City in contempt and imposing fines for 
noncompliance with an order requiring occupancy of a substance 
abuse and treatment facility, Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. 
94-1286 (3d Cir. ____, 1995) (Harris VI), and the appeal from 
another order adjudicating the City in contempt and imposing on 
it fines for its modification of procedures for designation of 
bailable pretrial detainees for release, Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 93-1988 (3d Cir. ____, 1995) (Harris VII).  
  
 None of these appeals directly challenges the 
stipulated maximum allowable population of prisoners to be 
housed, although that issue remains the raison d'être of all the 
orders and decrees that followed.  The three appeals that are the 
subject of this opinion instead concern the comprehensive Prison 
Planning Process (PPP) agreed to in the 1991 Consent Decree as an 
orderly planning process for the construction, operation and 
management of the Philadelphia prison system.  Necessarily 
implicated in this series of appeals is the role of the district 
court in overseeing the administration of county prison 
facilities pursuant to a consent decree designed to ameliorate 
overcrowding, and the use of its contempt power for alleged 
noncompliance with orders voluntarily undertaken. 
I. 
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AND THE CONSENT DECREES 
 In 1982 a group of inmates suffering from overcrowding 
at Holmesburg Prison filed a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983 and 1988 claiming violations of the First, Eighth, Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments against the City of Philadelphia and 
individual city officials who were responsible for administering 
the Philadelphia prison system.  An amended complaint filed April 
19, 1983 asserted claims for constitutional deprivation under the 
Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  In 1986, the lawsuit was expanded from its focus on 
Holmesburg Prison to encompass the Philadelphia prison system as 
a whole, and the plaintiff class was enlarged to include all 
past, present and future inmates in the Philadelphia prison 
  
system.2  We have been advised by counsel that the inmates are 
both pretrial detainees (on either nonbailable offenses or who 
cannot post the required bail) and sentenced prisoners, in 
approximately equal proportions.  Argument Transcript at 6. 
 In late 1986, the inmates negotiated a settlement with 
the City in which they gave up their claims for damages in return 
for, inter alia, the construction of a 440-bed detention facility 
in downtown Philadelphia by December 31, 1990 and a maximum 
allowable population for the then-existing facilities of the 
Philadelphia prison system.  App. at 91-92.  On December 30, 
1986, the district court approved the settlement and the next day 
entered a Consent Order (the "1986 Consent Decree") consistent 
with its terms.   
 By 1989 it became clear that the 440-bed detention 
facility would not be available by December 31, 1990.  In an 
attempt to alleviate the continued overcrowding, the City and the 
plaintiff class negotiated an agreement which strengthened 
                     
     
2
  In a somewhat parallel action, the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas found some twenty years ago that conditions in the 
Philadelphia prison system violated the prohibitions against 
cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  That court retains control over 
aspects of the prison system primarily related to prison 
conditions pursuant to a consent decree entered thereafter by the 
City and representatives of that plaintiff class.  See Jackson v. 
Hendrick, No. 71-2437 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, Apr. 7, 1972), 
aff'd, 309 A.2d 187 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), modified on other 
grounds, 321 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1974).  In 1986, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reviewing a subsequent remedial decree noted that 
as a result of subsequent actions taken there were "vast 
improvements in prison conditions."  See Jackson v. Hendrick, 503 
A.2d 400, 407 (Pa. 1986).   
  
population control measures, renewed the City's commitment to new 
prison construction, and required the City to plan rationally to 
meet the needs of existing and future inmates.  The parties 
submitted this proposed stipulation to the district court for 
approval, see Supp. App. at 1535, 1693, which was not 
forthcoming.3  Consequently, on February 14, 1990, the plaintiff 
class moved to vacate the 1986 Consent Decree and to reinstate 
the Second Amended Complaint.  See Supp. App. at 1674-1703.  The 
City opposed this motion and urged the court to consider that it 
had already agreed to devise a comprehensive prison plan dealing 
with ten-year population projections, prison construction and 
renovation, management and training, information systems, 
incarceration alternatives, and state court reforms, and had 
already spent $250,000 on consultants to help meet its 
responsibilities.  See Supp. App. at 1524-51.  On August 31, 1990 
the plaintiff class moved the court for emergency relief from the 
continued overcrowding.  In its response, the City concurred in 
the relief suggested and informed the court that the City had 
formulated a Prisons Master Plan as well as a Justice Facilities 
and Systems Improvement Strategy.  Supp. App. at 1542-43.   
 Continued negotiation led the parties to enter into a 
new Stipulation and Agreement culminating in another Consent 
Order approved by the district court (the "1991 Consent Decree"), 
this one considerably more detailed, which contained a series of 
                     
     
3
  Neither party has offered an explanation, and in light of 
subsequent events it is no longer relevant. 
  
stipulations and remedial steps aimed at alleviating the 
overcrowding in the prison system.4  In the 1991 Consent Decree, 
the parties stipulated that 
 4. New prison construction is inadvisable without 
detailed consideration of the future demands to be made on the 
Philadelphia prison system in light of: City population trends; 
trends in the crime rate; the habitability of existing prison 
facilities and the feasibility of their rehabilitation; the 
likelihood and effect of changes in the administration of 
criminal justice in Philadelphia; and the availability of 
alternatives to confinement.  
 
 5. Once the immediate and longer-range needs of the 
Philadelphia Prison System are determined realistically, how best 
to meet those needs should be addressed in a rational planning 
process.   
  
App. at 113. 
 As a long-term solution, the parties agreed to 
undertake a comprehensive Prison Planning Process, which entailed 
evaluation of the current facilities and a carefully considered 
long-range plan in addition to the construction of new facilities 
and the repair of existing facilities.  The parties also agreed 
to short-term remedies, one relating to a revised admissions 
moratorium and release mechanism and the other relating to the 
City's undertaking to provide a substance abuse program. 
 With respect to the long-term solution,  Paragraphs 
11-15 of the 1991 Consent Decree oblige the City to implement the 
Prison Planning Process and the Mayor to appoint a Criminal 
                     
     
4
   The City agreed to construct a facility or facilities 
"capable of housing in the aggregate at least 1000 inmates by May 
25, 1994."  ¶ 14, App. at 115.  The parties stipulated that the 
City's obligation to construct a 440-bed downtown facility was 
thereby superseded.  ¶ 12, App. at 115. 
  
Justice Project Coordinator responsible for carrying out the 
activities specified in the Prison Planning Process.  App. at 
114-15.  The Prison Planning Process addresses not only the 
physical plant of the Philadelphia prison system but also the 
operational aspects of running the prison system.  It includes 
population projections, a population management plan, 
promulgation of physical and operational standards, a capital 
projects management plan, an operational management plan, and a 
management information service plan.  App. at 129-35.  The City 
notes, and we agree, that implementation of these plans 
necessarily involves numerous state and local agencies.  The 1991 
Consent Decree explicitly contemplates "the involvement of the 
Philadelphia judiciary, the office of the District Attorney, and 
the Defender Association."  App. at 113-14.   
 Of most relevance to this appeal, the City undertook to 
develop a plan for promulgating physical and operational 
standards consistent with "constitutional standards" and 
"correctional industry standards of the American Correctional 
Association."  See note 5 infra.  This plan contemplates a three-
step process.  Paragraph C.1. of the Prison Planning Process 
requires the City to develop physical plant standards and general 
design guidelines for renovation and new construction capital 
projects.  App. at 131.5   
                     
     
5
  Such standards "shall comply with constitutional 
standards and requirements for the incarceration of sentenced 
prisoners and pretrial detainees, where applicable, and shall 
comply with correctional industry standards of the American 
Correctional Association (ACA), with reference to those of the 
American Jail Association (AJA), the Federal Department of 
  
 Paragraph C.2. requires the City to  
 
 [c]onduct an analysis of Philadelphia's existing jail 
and prison facilities using the physical plant 
standards and design guidelines developed pursuant to 
[Paragraph C.1.] . . . to determine how each existing 
facility might best be used, if at all, to house the 
projected daily prison population; and develop a plan, 
including implementation schedule, for necessary 
physical improvements to existing facilities. 
 
App. at 131-32.  This required analysis has come to be known as 
the "Facilities Audit."   
 Paragraph C.3. provides that the City shall "[d]evelop 
a phased plan, including an implementation schedule, for the 
development of such new correctional capacity as may be necessary 
to house the projected prison population."  App. at 132.  
Paragraph C.3. refers, in turn, to Paragraph A.2.b. which 
obligates the City to develop and periodically update a ten-year 
projection of the inmate population, taking into account the 
expected effect of anticipated case management and processing 
reforms.  App. at 128.  Hence, the third step in the process came 
to be known as the "Ten-Year Plan."  See also Harris v. Reeves, 
761 F. Supp. 382, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (approving 1991 Consent 
Decree and noting plans to develop and apply physical and 
operational standards).   
 The 1991 Consent Decree provides that if a plan is not 
submitted by its due date or if the plan which is submitted is 
determined by agreement of the parties or by the court to fall 
(..continued) 
Justice (DOJ), the American Public Health Association (APHA), the 
American Medical Association (AMA), and the American Bar 
Association (ABA)."  App. at 131.   
  
short of substantial compliance or to have been submitted in bad 
faith, defendants shall forfeit $500 per day for each day that no 
acceptable plan is submitted, increasing to $1000 per day after 
thirty days.  ¶ 22, App. at 121.  The City will also be subject 
to a penalty of $500 per day for the first thirty days and $1000 
per day thereafter for each day of delay in complying with a plan 
"milestone."  ¶ 27, App. at 123.  All penalties "shall be used or 
distributed as determined by the Court on the advice of the 
parties and the Special Master."  ¶ 28, App. at 124.  The 
district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of 
the 1991 Consent Decree.  ¶ 33, App. at 125.6    
                     
     
6
  The 1991 Consent Decree also provided mechanisms for 
resolution of disputes over plans.  After submission of each 
plan, the plaintiff class and all other affected entities have 
ten days to submit comments and objections to the Special Master.  
¶ 20, App. at 120.  After all objections are submitted, the 
parties and other affected entities, with the assistance of the 
Special Master, are to attempt to resolve their differences 
through negotiation.  ¶ 21,  App. at 120-21.  If these 
differences cannot be resolved within 30 days after submission of 
all objections, the Special Master must submit the City's plan, 
all objections, and his own recommendation to the district court, 
which may then decide whether or not to approve the plan.  Either 
the plaintiff class or the City may request a hearing concerning 
the plan at issue within ten days, or any other affected entity 
may request a hearing upon a demonstration of "good cause."   
¶ 21, App. at 120-21.   
  
II. 
FACTS LEADING TO THIS APPEAL 
 Under the 1991 Consent Decree the City was obligated to 
develop physical and operational standards for the prisons by 
September 6, 1991; prepare the Facilities Audit by December 6, 
1991; and draft the Ten-Year Plan by July 31, 1992.  App. at 138.  
After the City had difficulty in meeting these dates, the parties 
negotiated revisions embodied in the January 1992 Stipulation and 
Agreement Amending Due Dates for Plans Comprising the Prison 
Planning Process (hereafter "Amended Stipulation") (entered by 
the court on January 7, 1992) to April 30, 1992,  August 31, 
1992, and December 31, 1992 respectively.  Addenda to City's 
Brief at A-68 to A-69.  Paragraph 8 of the Amended Stipulation 
provides that the penalties described in the 1991 Consent Decree 
for late submission "are presently accruing" for those 
submissions that were late, id. at A-58, but Paragraph 11 
established a procedure for modification of the revised 
deadlines.7  Apparently the City did not follow that procedure, 
and no revision of the dates in the Amended Stipulation was made. 
 In return for the revised dates agreed to in the 
Amended Stipulation, the parties also agreed to added teeth in 
the procedure for imposition of penalties.  If the City failed to 
                     
     
7
  That procedure required submission of a "Phase 1 
Schedule" by December 20, 1991 and a "Phase 2 Schedule" by 
March 16, 1992, and provided that failure to submit these 
schedules made defendants subject to daily penalties.  Addenda to 
City's Brief at A-59 to A-60. 
 
  
comply with the revised dates, the daily penalties from the 1991 
Consent Decree "shall immediately accrue."  ¶ 13, id. at A-61.  
Furthermore, the new procedure expressly authorized collection of 
daily penalties without court action.   
 Paragraph 16 provides: 
 16. Any daily penalty that accrues pursuant to this 
Stipulation and Agreement, including all accrued amounts, shall 
be paid into the Court . . . without any further direction from 
the Court and without any application to the Court by the 
plaintiffs.  All penalties owed by the defendants and the City 
shall be paid into the Court within thirty (30) days following 
receipt of the plaintiffs' demand for such payment.  Plaintiffs 
shall not make such demand with respect to any Plan unless and 
until notified by the Special Master that the Plan was not 
submitted by its Due Date in the Revised Schedule (subject to any 
modification of that date pursuant to paragraph 11 hereof). 
 
Id. at A-62 (emphasis added).  
 
 Due dates could be extended by the Special Master "upon 
application by the [City] . . . supported by good cause, provided 
that the application is filed with the Special Master and served 
on the plaintiffs at least ten (10) days prior to the Due Date it 
seeks to extend."  ¶ 17, id. at A-62 to A-63.  "Good cause" was 
strictly defined to mean causes "not reasonably foreseeable" 
which are "entirely" beyond the City's control and without its 
fault or negligence. 
 In January 1992, a new mayor for the City of 
Philadelphia, Edward G. Rendell, was sworn into office.  On 
January 7, 1992, as one of the first acts of the new 
administration, the City filed a Motion to Modify the December 
30, 1986 Decree and the March 11, 1991 Decree.  Specifically, the 
City moved for an order of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of 
  
Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)-(6) to vacate the provisions of the 
consent decrees concerning population limits and the non-
admission or release of pre-trial detainees.  The City gave three 
grounds for the proposed modification: First, the consent decrees 
were ultra vires acts by the previous administration because the 
City was obliged under state law to follow state court 
incarceration orders and it lacked the power to bind future 
administrations in the administration of police power authority;  
Second, experience with the qualified admissions moratorium and 
the release mechanism demonstrated that it was no longer 
equitable to implement the decrees for reasons of public safety 
and the orderly administration of justice; Third, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), 
holding that an Eighth Amendment violation requires proof of 
"deliberate indifference" by prison administrators, constituted a 
change in law applicable to modification of consent decrees.    
 Notably, in the Motion to Modify the City re-committed 
itself to the Prison Planning Process, stating: 
 This administration . . . recognizes that the prisoners 
and the public have legitimate interests in the 
enlargement and improvement of Philadelphia's prisons 
and in sound penological policies.  In fact, consistent 
with the desire of this Court to expedite the 
construction of sound prisons, on December 11, 1991, 
then Mayor-elect Rendell wrote then Managing Director 
Pingree asking that the prison planning and 
construction schedule be speeded up.  As Mayor, Mr. 
Rendell will direct the implementation of this request 
as urgent City policy.   
 
App. at 223.  
  
 In September 1992, the district court set an 
evidentiary hearing for November 9, 1992 on the City's Motion to 
Modify, but by order of November 6, 1992 postponed the hearing 
until January 25, 1993 and required the City to submit proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of that motion 
by November 30, 1992.  In compliance, the City submitted its 
proposed findings and conclusions, which relied in part on some 
of the data developed by its consultant, the Criminal Justice 
Institute, in connection with its preparation of the Facilities 
Audit and the Ten-Year Plan, even though those documents had yet 
to be submitted.8   
 At a regular status hearing on December 18, 1992, the 
court suggested that the City should comply with its obligations 
under the Prison Planning Process required by the 1991 Consent 
Decree before it would adjudicate the Motion to Modify, App. at 
665-67, even though the City was willing to allow the plaintiff 
class to proceed with discovery of its experts in connection with 
the Motion to Modify.  App. at 667.  By order of January 11, 1993 
the court, finding that "[t]he conduct of the City necessitates 
the postponement of the hearing on the Motion to Vacate until the 
conclusion of the process contemplated by the Consent Decree," 
expressly linked the scheduling of discovery and a hearing date 
                     
     
8
  Specifically, the proposed findings relied upon (1) a 
report entitled An Alternative-to-Incarceration Plan for 
Philadelphia: Findings and Proposed Strategies, November 1992, 
prepared by the Crime and Justice Research Institute and (2) 
material prepared by the Criminal Justice Institute.  Addenda to 
City's Brief at A-38. 
  
on the Motion to Modify to the City's submission of the 
Facilities Audit.  See Supp. App. at 1571-72.  A rescheduled 
hearing was tentatively set for April 1993.    
 The City had submitted its proposed physical standards 
and design guidelines under subparagraph C.1. on August 14, 
1992.9  App. at 773, 1276-77.  Plaintiffs responded with comments 
and objections to the standards, and the City submitted revised 
standards.  The parties then entered into some negotiations, App. 
at 773, 1276-77, and discussed their differences at several 
meetings with the Special Master, but apparently he never 
submitted the physical standards to the district court for 
approval.  App. at 1276-77.  Therefore, the district court still 
has neither approved or disapproved these standards.   
 Although neither the 1991 Consent Decree nor the 
Amended Stipulation relieved the City from its obligation to 
proceed with the Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan, the City 
submitted neither document by the stipulated dates of August 31, 
1992 and December 31, 1992.  This led to the extensive chronology 
of missed deadlines and broken promises set forth in the 
margin.10 
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  Because the City had failed to submit the physical 
standards by April 30, 1992, as required by the Amended 
Stipulation, the district court, following a hearing, imposed 
$78,000 in penalties with the possibility for remission.  
Thereafter, the court refused the requested remission because the 
City had not requested an extension prior to the due date nor 
shown good cause for delay.  Supp. App. at 1141, 1557.  The City 
did not appeal from this imposition of penalties.   
 
     
10
 By way of letter of September 14, 1992, the plaintiffs 
reminded the City that it was required to pay stipulated daily  
  
 On October 5, 1993 the district court sua sponte found 
that the City's conduct constituted "a pattern of contempt of the 
Consent Decree which should not be permitted to continue."  
Addenda to City's Brief at A-4.  The court ordered that the City 
pay $584,000 in fines due and owing, ordered submission of both 
documents within ten days, and scheduled a hearing "to consider 
(..continued) 
penalties upon demand.  Supp. App. at 1558.  On December 18, 
1992, at a status conference the City represented that both the 
Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan could be ready by mid-
February although counsel for the City noted, "[p]art of the 
problem is we can't do an audit until we have agreed upon 
physical standards."  App. at 620-21.  On December 21, 1992 the 
City requested an extension for submission of the Facilities 
Audit and the Ten-Year Plan.  Supp. App. at 1565.  It projected 
that the two documents would be completed by March or April 1993 
but gave no firm date for submission.  On March 24, 1993, the 
City sent a letter to plaintiffs and to the court projecting 
submission on or before June 1, 1993.  Addenda to City's Brief at 
A-26.  Then, on May 10 the City sent another letter advising 
submission would not be before the end of June.  Id. at A-22.  
The court then rescheduled the hearing on the City's Motion to 
Modify to December 20, 1993.  Id. at A-3.  On June 9, 1993 the 
plaintiff submitted a demand for penalties for the City's 
tardiness.  Id. at A-3.  As of that date, the accrued stipulated 
penalties totaled $267,000 for 282 days of default in submitting 
the Facilities Audit and $145,000 for 160 days of default in 
submitting the Ten-Year Plan.   
 
 At the end of June the City sent yet another letter  
requesting a further extension of up to thirty days.  Id. at  
A-21.  On July 29, the City wrote that it hoped that the 
documents would be complete by the end of August.  Id. at A-17.  
The Special Master wrote to the City on August 27, 1993 
requesting an estimate when the documents would be submitted, but 
there was no reply from the City and no submission of the 
Facilities Audit or the Ten-Year Plan.  On September 3, 1993 the 
plaintiffs demanded payment of stipulated penalties totalling 
$584,000 for the City's failure to submit the Facilities Audit 
and the Ten-Year Plan without receiving extensions of time for 
good cause.  Id. at A-3 to A-4.  The City ignored the demands for 
the stipulated penalties.   
 
 
  
imposition of additional accrued fines and/or whatever other 
measures of coercive civil contempt necessary to obtain 
submission of the Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan, including 
but not limited to dismissal [of the City's] . . . Motion to 
Modify."  See Addenda to City's Brief at A-5.  In the order, the 
court noted that one of the named defendants, Commissioner J. 
Patrick Gallagher, Superintendent of the Philadelphia Prison 
System, had written a letter stating that there were 5,400 beds 
for 5,000 inmates, which appeared to be based on conclusions from 
the Facilities Audit that had not yet been submitted as required.  
Id. at A-4.   
   The City, which had still not made the required 
submissions, moved on October 15, 1993 for an extension until 
January 15, 1994.  The court granted that motion as to the Ten-
Year Plan but ordered the Facilities Audit to be submitted 
"forthwith in whatever form it presently exists, whether as a 
preliminary outline, draft, text subject to review, etc."  Id. at 
A-16.  
 On October 29, 1993, the court held what all parties 
agree was a contempt hearing to determine further coercive civil 
contempt sanctions needed to obtain submission of the late 
material.  See App. at 1206-1324.  Prior to this hearing the 
plaintiff class had sought to obtain production of the Facilities 
Audit and the Ten-Year Plan by issuing a subpoena for the 
production of the documents.  At the October 29 hearing the court 
considered arguments from the City why the subpoena should be 
quashed, why the City had been unable to comply with the 
  
deadlines for submission of the Facilities Audit, and why it 
should not dismiss the Motion to Modify as a sanction for civil 
contempt.   
 In the course of that hearing, David L. Cohen, Mayor 
Rendell's Chief of Staff, testified that the City had completed 
the Audit by April 30, 1993 but that because it had decided to 
fully integrate the Facilities Audit with the Ten-Year Plan, it 
declined to produce the Facilities Audit on the ground that it 
contained materials that it considered to be subject to attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine.  App. at 1249-86.  
Plaintiffs' counsel introduced as evidence a transcript of the 
testimony of Commissioner Gallagher in the state court 
proceedings stating that the Facilities Audit was in existence.  
App. at 1229-33.  The City objected, arguing that Commissioner 
Gallagher's statements were not on this record, and also argued 
that Commissioner Gallagher's letter as to the number of 
available beds, previously referred to by the court, "was 
erroneous [and] . . . in no way represents the policy of the 
City."  App. at 1215-16.  The City admitted that it had received 
an eight-volume report from its experts from which the Facilities 
Audit could be redacted.  It stated that it was willing to submit 
the Facilities Audit without further review but had not yet done 
so because the October 5 order required production of both the 
Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan which it was not yet 
prepared to produce.  App. at 1244-46.   
  At the conclusion of the October 29 hearing, the court 
announced it would accept the Facilities Audit by November 8, 
  
1993 but would sanction the City by dismissing the City's Motion 
to Modify.  It so ordered on November 1, 1993 after finding the 
City to be in contempt for violating the 1991 Consent Decree, 
Paragraph 16 of the Amended Stipulation, and the October 5 order.  
See Addenda to City's Brief at A-32 to A-33.  In dismissing the 
City's Motion to Modify, the court did not articulate whether 
this was a dismissal with or without prejudice or whether the 
City might petition for leave to refile once it had submitted the 
documents. 
 In a memorandum opinion of November 17, 1993 sur the 
November 1 order dismissing the Motion to Modify, the district 
court criticized the City's "deliberate strategy of selective 
compliance with the court's orders."  Id. at A-36.  It found the 
City's claim of ignorance and lack of funds to be patently 
pretextual and found there was clear and convincing evidence that 
the City had failed to comply with a valid court order.  Id. at 
A-43 to A-44.    
 On November 8, 1993, the City finally submitted the 
Facilities Audit and on January 14, 1994 it submitted the Ten-
Year Plan.  App. at 77, 81.  
 The orders appealed in Nos. 93-1977 and 93-2117 are 
final decisions within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See 
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 874 F.2d 147 (3d 
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 948 (1989), on remand 
893 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1990); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local 
Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 552 F.2d 498 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).  The order appealed in 
  
No. 93-2116 is an injunction over which we would have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
 The imposition of contempt is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard and will only be disturbed if there is an 
error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.  United 
States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 727 (3d Cir. 1993).  A finding 
of civil contempt must be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Quinter v. Volkswagen of America, 676 F.2d 969, 974 
(3d Cir. 1982).  We determine on a plenary basis whether the 
district court committed an error of law.  American Greetings 
Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1146-49 (3d Cir. 
1986).11   We review the sanction imposed for civil contempt for 
abuse of discretion.  See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).  We also review the imposition of 
stipulated penalties under an abuse of discretion standard.  See 
Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1473 (1992).  The City does not 
contest the finding of fact that it was late with the submissions 
                     
     
11
  The City's contention that our review of a finding of 
civil contempt is plenary is based on a misreading of American 
Greetings.  In American Greetings, there were two contempt orders 
on appeal.  One of the two was reversed because the preliminary 
injunction on which it was based was insufficiently specific, a 
legal issue.  We upheld the other contempt order which "clearly 
[fell] . . . within the scope of [the underlying] Consent Order" 
applying a much more limited review.  807 F.2d at 1148. 
 
  
nor does it raise any legal question over the proper 
interpretation of the consent decree in these appeals.  Thus, we 
review the orders at issue in these appeals for abuse of 
discretion. 
 The City makes essentially three arguments in its 
appeal of the imposition of monetary penalties and the dismissal 
of its Motion to Modify as a civil contempt sanction.  First, it 
claims it was not afforded due process before being adjudicated 
in contempt and before imposition of civil contempt sanctions.  
Second, it contends it was unable to meet the deadlines because 
of unanticipated delays, and that inability to comply with a 
court order despite diligently attempting to do so is an absolute 
defense to contempt.  Third, it contends the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing the "severe" and "punitive" 
contempt sanction of dismissing the City's Motion to Modify the 
Consent Decree, when less severe remedies were available to 
coerce compliance and the Motion was unrelated to the 
contumacious actions.  We consider the City's arguments in the 
context of reviewing each order of the district court in turn.  
  
A. 
The October 5, 1993 Order 
 In the October 5, 1993 order, the district court 
recapitulated the relevant facts, the City's failure to make the 
submissions when due, and the various communications from the 
City delaying the dates when the submissions would be made.  The 
district court stated that "[d]efendant's conduct appears to 
constitute a pattern of contempt of the Consent Decree which 
should not be permitted to continue."  The court then ordered the 
City to pay into court the entire amount of the stipulated 
penalties (denominated by the court as "fines") due and owing at 
the time of plaintiffs' September 3, 1993 demand letter for 
failure to submit the Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan when 
due.  The court also ordered defendants to submit the Facilities 
Audit and Ten-Year Plan within ten days and set a hearing to 
consider imposition of additional accrued fines or other measures 
of coercive civil contempt.  Addenda to City's Brief at A-4 to  
A-5. 
 We believe that notwithstanding the district court's 
reference to contempt, we should not analyze the October 5, 1993 
order as an order for civil contempt.  There is no explicit 
finding of contempt, such as that contained in the Order of 
November 1, 1993, which expressly states, "[t]he defendants are 
found to be in contempt of the following court orders . . . ."  
The reference to the defendants' "pattern of contempt" in the 
October 5 order appears to be descriptive rather than a formal 
finding of contempt.  Thus, although the November 1, 1993 order 
  
clearly is one of civil contempt and must be analyzed as such, we 
view the October 5, 1993 order as the imposition of stipulated 
penalties.    
 As the City argues, due process does require notice and 
a hearing before a finding of contempt is made and before the 
imposition of contempt sanctions so that the parties "have an 
opportunity to explain the conduct deemed deficient . . . and 
that a record will be available to facilitate appellate review."  
Newton v. A.C. & S. Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1127 & n.5 (3d Cir. 
1990).  For an indirect contempt, such as failure to obey a court 
order, it is appropriate to give notice by an order to show cause 
and to hold a hearing.  See Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 
653 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); 
see also Roe v. Operation Rescue, 920 F.2d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 
1990) (due process before imposing civil contempt requires an 
"opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"). 
 However, the City did not object in the district court 
on constitutional grounds to the court's procedure in finding it 
had violated the Amended Stipulation without entering an order to 
show cause and without giving the City an opportunity to present 
evidence.  As a general rule we will not consider objections that 
have not been raised in the district court.  See Pritzker v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 
1993); In re American Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 927 (3d. 
Cir. 1992); Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 
1990); Flick v. Borg-Warner Corp., 892 F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 
  
1989); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 
932 (3d. Cir. 1976).  Moreover, this general rule "applies with 
added force where the timely raising of the issue would have 
permitted the parties to develop a factual record."  American 
Biomaterials, 954 F.2d at 927-28.   
 The City contends that it should be excused for failing 
to raise this objection because it had no opportunity to do so in 
light of the district court's sua sponte entry of the October 5 
order.  Therefore, it argues, it is not barred from raising the 
due process issue for the first time in this court. 
 We need not consider whether the City has a valid 
excuse for failing to object in the district court or whether its 
failure to raise the issue in the district court precludes our 
consideration because, as we suggested earlier, we believe the 
order of October 5 directing payment of the stipulated penalties 
need not have been denominated a civil contempt order.12            
 Paragraph 13 of the Amended Stipulation provides that 
 If the defendants fail to comply with the Due Date in 
the Revised Schedule . . . then the daily penalties 
described in paragraph 7 hereof shall immediately 
accrue for that Plan . . . . Separate penalties shall 
accrue for each Plan that is not submitted by its Due 
Date in the Revised Schedule . . . .  
 
 
Paragraph 16 continues:  "Any daily penalty that accrues pursuant 
to this Stipulation and Agreement, including all accrued amounts, 
                     
     
12
  In light of our conclusion, we do not address the 
plaintiffs' argument that the City could have filed a motion 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) to relieve it of the order on the 
ground it was void for failure to accord it due process. 
 
  
shall be paid into the Court . . . without any further direction 
from the Court and without any application to the Court by the 
plaintiffs."  (emphasis added).  Thus, the court's order of 
October 5 was, in effect, the imposition of liquidated or 
stipulated penalties, and the reference to contempt for that 
purpose was extraneous.  
 Consent decrees are interpreted under ordinary contract 
law principles.  See Fox v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Although consent decrees 
are judicial acts, they have many of the attributes of contracts 
voluntarily undertaken."); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. and 
Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 318-19 (3d Cir.) (treating Final Settlement 
Agreement as a contract), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990); 
Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1539 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).  It follows that a consent decree 
may contain a provision for liquidated damages for breach of the 
decree in the same manner as a contract which sets the damages at 
an amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or 
actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of the 
proof of the loss.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 
(1981).  Such a liquidated damages clause "saves the time of 
courts, juries, parties and witnesses and reduces the expense of 
litigation."  Id. cmt. A.  
 In this case, the Amended Stipulation to the 1991 
Consent Decree explicitly obliged the City to pay over the 
accrued fines to the plaintiff class without court intervention.  
The parties might have made some other arrangement but they chose 
  
to agree to self-executing penalties.  In return for this 
automatic imposition of penalties, the City received, inter alia, 
an extended deadline for its voluntarily undertaken obligation to 
produce the Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan.  This was 
material upon which the entire Prison Planning Process was 
dependent.  In light of the plain language of the Amended 
Stipulation, we find completely unpersuasive the City's argument 
that its consent to the imposition of stipulated penalties did 
not waive its rights to notice and a hearing before those 
penalties could be imposed and collected. 
 The City argues that under the 1991 Consent Decree and 
the Amended Stipulation, the district court was required to find 
that there was no good cause for the City's delays in submission 
of the documents before the court could impose the penalties to 
which the City had agreed.  Under Paragraph 17 of the Amended 
Stipulation, "[a]ny Due Date for a Plan specified in the Revised 
Schedule . . . may be extended by the Special Master upon 
application by the defendant supported by good cause, provided 
that the application is filed with the Special Master and served 
on the plaintiffs at least ten (10) days prior to the Due Date it 
seeks to extend."  Addenda to City's Brief at A-62 to A-63 
(emphasis added).  The Stipulation defines "good cause" as: 
 Unavoidable delays in complying with a Plan Due Date 
caused solely by causes not reasonably foreseeable by 
the parties and which are entirely beyond the control 
and without the fault or negligence of the defendants 
or their agents or their independent contractors, . . . 
and shall include, without limitation, the following 
events:  Acts of God, acts of war, quarantine 
restrictions, general strikes throughout the relevant 
trades, freight embargoes not caused or participated in 
  
by defendants, fire, flood, epidemics, and weather of 
unusual severity. 
 
Id. 
 
 The City contends that the district court should have 
held a hearing or hearings to determine whether the City's 
explanation of the delays constituted good cause.  The City's 
argument is disingenuous.  It never candidly faces up to the fact 
that under the Amended Stipulation allowance of one or more 
extensions for "good cause" is conditioned on the City's timely 
application.  The City never made any such "good cause" 
application.  Instead of making the required "application," the 
City announced its expected tardiness in a series of letters, 
some of which requested the court to extend the due dates, but 
none even purported to show "good cause" as defined.  Moreover, 
the only formal motion the City made, the motion of October 15, 
1993, was not timely, since it was filed thirteen months after 
the Facilities Audit was due and nine months after the Ten-Year 
Plan was due.  The district court justifiably concluded that this 
pattern of conduct evinced a pattern of disregard and 
noncompliance with even the most elementary procedures to which 
the City had committed itself.  By its own actions, the City 
forfeited its right to a good cause hearing before imposition of 
the stipulated penalties. 
 When the City did have the opportunity to state the 
reasons for its failure to timely produce the Facilities Audit 
and Ten-Year Plan, it attributed its failure to unanticipated 
delays and the difficulty of coordinating multiple agencies and 
  
branches of governments to formulate the plans.  If the Order of 
October 5, 1993 were an adjudication of civil contempt, the City 
would have a valid defense were it able to show physical 
impossibility.  See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 
673 F.2d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1982) (in banc), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1038 (1984); see also Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513 
(11th Cir. 1984).  There is general support for the proposition 
that a defendant may not be held in contempt as long as it took 
all reasonable steps to comply.  See, e.g., Securities and Exch. 
Comm'n. v. AMX, Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1993); New 
York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1351 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (contempt may be found only if party did not 
diligently attempt to comply in reasonable manner), cert. denied, 
495 U.S. 947 (1990); National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange, 
861 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1988).    
 However, the burden is that of the defendant to 
introduce evidence beyond "a mere assertion of inability," and to 
show that it has made "in good faith all reasonable efforts to 
comply."  See Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 
F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Ryan, 
402 U.S. 530, 534 (1971)); see also United States v. Millstone 
Enterprises, Inc., 864 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 One of the unanticipated delays to which the City 
refers is the failure of the district court to approve the 
physical plant standards and general design guidelines the City 
had previously submitted.  The City contends this delay 
interfered with its preparation of the Facilities Audit and Ten-
  
Year Plan, because the Facilities Audit was to be based on the 
physical standards.  At the outset, we note that had the district 
court issued a ruling on the proposed standards and design 
guidelines submitted by the City, it is likely that at least some 
of the subsequent delay would have been avoided.  Nonetheless, at 
oral argument the City conceded that it would have been possible 
for it to have prepared the Facilities Audit using the physical 
standards it proposed, and indeed ultimately it used the proposed 
standards even without court approval.  Argument Transcript at 
42-43.   
 Although we recognize that proceeding on the basis of 
as-yet-unapproved physical standards may have subjected the City 
to additional cost if amendment to the Facilities Audit were 
required to accommodate standards the court subsequently adopted, 
the possibility of such a cost increase did not make the City's 
submission of the Facilities Audit "impossible."  Moreover, it is 
undisputed that the City had the opportunity to seek an extension 
of time from the district court on that basis, but did not do so.  
 In Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 
1114 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980), we 
upheld the district court's modification of a consent decree 
based on its finding that despite the City's good faith efforts, 
performance was impossible and circumstances were beyond the 
parties' contemplation and defendant's control.  See id. at 1120.  
In contrast, in this case the district court found that the City 
was not unable to comply with the 1991 Consent Decree and the 
Amended Stipulation.  That finding was not clearly erroneous.  
  
 At the hearing before the district court on October 29, 
1993, the City sought to explain its failure to produce the 
Facilities Audit on the ground that it had planned to produce an 
integrated document with both the Facilities Audit and the Ten-
Year Plan, and that it was not yet ready to produce the Ten-Year 
Plan.  The district court rejected this explanation, noting that 
the "'decision' to complete the Audit and Ten-Year Plan 
simultaneously was made solely by the defendants, without the 
agreement of the plaintiff class or approval of the court."  
Addenda to City's Brief at A-47.   
 The court's finding is fully supported in the record.  
Although the City argues that it was not until it received the 
Order of October 28, 1993 directing it to submit the Facilities 
Order "forthwith" and the Ten-Year Plan at a later date that it 
understood that the district court would permit submission of the 
Facilities Audit separately, nothing in the language of the 1991 
Consent Decree suggests that the two documents must be 
integrated.  In fact, the agreement of the City to submit the two 
documents on two different and sequential dates shows that the 
City must have understood that the two documents were to be 
distinct.  The Consent Decree did not preclude combination of the 
two documents, but it contains no provision that authorized late 
submission of the Facilities Audit if combined with the Ten-Year 
Plan.  In any event, both were late. 
 A party may not rely on its unilateral interpretation 
of the requirements for compliance in complex institutional 
reform litigation as an excuse for noncompliance.  See Pennhurst, 
  
673 F.2d at 637-38 (criticizing government officials for 
resorting to self-help in interpretation of consent decree after 
enactment of restrictive legislation rather than seeking relief 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) or (6)).  Thus we 
reject the City's attempt to excuse its noncompliance on the 
supposed link between the Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan.  
 The district court rejected the City's proffered 
defense of inability to comply, noting that Mayoral Chief of 
Staff Cohen had admitted that drafts of the Facilities Audit and 
Ten-Year Plan were already available and under review and that 
the "reasons asserted [by the City] to justify [the motion for an 
extension] were factually in error."  Addenda to City's Brief at 
A-41 to A-42.  It found that the City's asserted claim of 
"ignorance of the requirements of the Consent Decree and efforts 
required to effect compliance for the first eight months of [the 
Rendell] . . . administration . . . belies the competence of 
counsel and the history of this case" in light of the numerous 
meetings between the Special Master, the parties and the court.  
Id. at A-43.  It also found that the City's asserted claim of 
lack of funds was inaccurate, given the availability of funding 
from City bonds authorized for that purpose.  Those findings are 
not clearly erroneous. 
    Nothing that the City has argued convinces us that it 
was in fact unable to comply with a schedule to which it had 
agreed and which had been revised at its request.13  It has 
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  In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 
F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1987), on which the City relies, the court 
  
pointed to nothing in the record that supports its claim of good 
cause for failure to comply, and certainly nothing that meets the 
strict definition of that term in the consent decree.   
   Based thereon, the imposition of stipulated penalties 
of $584,000 was not an abuse of discretion.  We will therefore 
affirm the district court's order of October 5, 1993. 
 B. 
 The October 28, 1993 Order 
 The Order of October 28, l993 granted the City's motion 
for an extension of time to submit the Ten-Year Plan but denied 
the motion for an extension of time to submit the Facilities 
Audit, and ordered its submission "forthwith."  As noted in the 
previous section, the City submitted the Facilities Audit on 
November 8, 1993 and the Ten-Year Plan on January 14, 1994.  
Thus, we must consider whether this appeal is moot, which depends 
on whether there exists a "'subject matter upon which the 
judgment of the court can operate' to make a substantive 
determination on the merits."  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. 
State of New Jersey, 772 F.2d 35, 39 (3d Cir. l985) (quoting Ex 
Parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (l900)).14   
(..continued) 
was reviewing an application for contempt brought against OSHA 
for its lengthy delays in setting standards.  The court declined 
to hold OSHA in contempt but required that it adhere to dates it 
set out in its response to the contempt motion.  OSHA, unlike the 
City in this case, had not signed a consent decree specifying 
dates certain for compliance.  Thus that case is inapplicable 
here. 
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  The "availability of effective relief is one measure of 
the existence of a continuing controversy between parties with 
cognizable interests in the outcome" and "also may indicate the 
  
 The City responds that because the Order of October 28 
"put [it] in the position, on October 29th, of having to stand in 
contempt for not having produced [the] audit," it is not moot.  
See Argument Transcript at 16-17.  The City also implies that it 
may be subject to daily fines for violation of the October 28 
order.  Argument Transcript at 18.  As a general principle, once 
a party has complied with a court order or injunction, and has 
not been penalized or suffered any prejudice that could be 
remedied on appeal, the appeal is moot.  See generally 13A 
Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 
3533.10 (1984).  In the case of the October 28 Order, the 
district court imposed no fines and the City points to nothing in 
the record that suggests such an order is either imminent or 
forthcoming. 
 Although we agree that the Order of October 28 is 
implicated in the City's arguments in its appeal of the Order of 
November 1, l993, those arguments, to the extent relevant, can be 
(..continued) 
presence of a continuing effect of the alleged misconduct on a 
complainant."  International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 
F.2d 912, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1987).  Accord Fauconniere Mfg. Corp. 
v. Secretary of Defense, 794 F.2d 350, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(appeal of preliminary injunction enjoining performance of 
contract moot when stay pending appeal granted and contract 
completed); Gjertsen v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 751 F.2d 199, 
201-02 (7th Cir. 1984) (appeal of grant of preliminary injunction 
of minimum signature requirements for primary ballots moot where 
primary held and defendants did not request election to be  
re-run); cf. Brill v. General Indus. Enter., 234 F.2d 465, 469 
(3d Cir. 1956) (appeal of refusal to enjoin sale of corporation's 
assets moot because sale consummated and "where the act sought to 
be restrained has been performed, the appellate courts will deny 
review on the ground of mootness"). 
  
fully explored and analyzed in the context of that appeal.  
Therefore, we will dismiss No. 93-2116, the appeal from the Order 
of October 28, 1993, as moot. 
C. 
The November 1, l993 Order 
1.  The Finding of Contempt 
 As noted earlier, the Order of November 1, l993 
expressly found the City in contempt, and based that finding on 
the City's failure to submit the Facilities Audit and Ten-Year 
Plan by the dates required by the 1991 Consent Decree and the 
Amended Stipulation, its failure to pay the stipulated penalties 
when they were demanded by plaintiffs' letters of June 9, l993 
and September 3, l993 as required by paragraph 16 of the Amended 
Stipulation, and its failure to submit the Facilities Audit 
within ten days of the court's Order of October 5, l993, as 
required therein. 
 The applicable principles have been set forth in our 
earlier cases.  To prove civil contempt the court must find that 
(1) a valid court order existed, (2) the defendant had knowledge 
of the order, and (3) the defendant disobeyed the order.  Roe v. 
Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990).  The validity 
of the underlying order is not open to consideration.  Inmates of 
Allegheny County Jail, 874 F.2d at 152 (citing Pennhurst, 673 
F.2d at 636-37).  The resolution of ambiguities ought to favor 
the party charged with contempt.  United States on behalf of 
I.R.S. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir. 1983).  A contempt 
citation should not be granted if "there is ground to doubt the 
  
wrongfulness of" the defendant's conduct.  Quinter, 676 F.2d at 
974 (quotation omitted). 
 Most of the City's arguments challenging the finding of 
contempt go to its purported inability to comply.  Our rejection 
of those arguments in our consideration of the Order of October 
5, l993 is equally applicable here.  However, some of the City's 
additional arguments must also be considered.  
  The City contends that the district court erred as a 
matter of law when it ordered the production of preliminary 
unreviewed drafts of the Facilities Audit because this material 
was protected by the deliberative process privilege.  Most of the 
cases cited by the City do not arise under any possible common 
law deliberate process privilege but instead arise under 
Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(5), which has a specific exemption for "intra-agency 
memorandums."  See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 
132 (1975); State of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 889 
F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1989); Lead Industries Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 
F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 1979).   
 Nonetheless, there may be some basis for the City's 
objection to the direction in the Order of October 28, 1993 to 
submit the Facilities Audit "in whatever form it presently 
exists, whether as a preliminary outline, draft, text subject to 
review, etc."  We need not address the appropriateness of such a 
direction because the district court did not find the City in 
contempt of the Order of October 28.  Instead, it was the City's 
failure to comply with the provision of the Order of October 5, 
  
l993 directing it to submit the Facilities Audit within ten days 
that was one of the bases of the contempt Order of November 1, 
l993.  Because that order did not require the City to produce any 
internal documents, the City has no applicable privilege defense, 
even if such a defense could be raised at this stage.               
 In a somewhat related argument, the City asserts that 
because a newly-elected Mayor may set new policies, the election 
of Mayor Rendell who took office at the beginning of l992 
entitled it to a grace period to redo the Facilities Audit and 
the Ten-Year Plan.  The City concedes, as it must, that the 
election of a new administration does not relieve it of valid 
obligations assumed by previous administrations.  Just as the 
City would not have been free to break its contract with a vendor 
or other contractor because of the election of a new 
administration, so too changes in administrative policy alone do 
not permit the City to unilaterally default on its obligations to 
the court and other litigants. 
 Moreover, in the case on which the City relies for its 
"grace period" argument, Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 
(7th Cir. 1993) (in banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1831 (1994), 
the city defendants had brought a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) motion 
seeking relief from a consent judgment on the ground, as set 
forth in that rule, that "it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application."  The City has 
never argued, here or in the district court, that it was no 
longer equitable that it should produce a Facilities Audit and 
Ten-Year Plan, documents upon which the Prison Planning Process 
  
hinged.  The cases are therefore not comparable.  We see no 
reason to reverse the finding of contempt contained in the 
November 1, l993 order, because the record shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that the City failed to comply with the 
provisions of the prior orders cited.15 
 We turn therefore to the sanction imposed by the 
district court for the contempt, i.e. dismissal of the Motion to 
Modify.  It is to this sanction that the City directs its most 
vigorous argument and which the amici addressed in their briefs. 
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  The City also argues that the district court penalized 
it for appealing the Order of October 5, l993 imposing the 
stipulated penalties by basing the contempt finding in the Order 
of November l, l993 in part on the City's failure to pay the 
stipulated penalties in response to the plaintiffs' demand 
letters.  We need not address this argument because the City's 
failure to abide by the other two orders listed is clear.  This 
argument may be addressed on remand should the appropriate 
sanction be considered once again.  
2. Dismissal of Motion to Modify as Contempt Sanction 
 In contrast to its failure to invoke Rule 60(b) as a 
basis for extricating itself from the deadlines for filing       
the Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan, the City did use Rule 
60(b)(4)-(6) as the basis for its January 1992 Motion to Modify 
certain provisions of the 1986 Consent Decree and the 1991 
Consent Decree.  As set forth in the facts supra, this motion was 
filed by the new City administration seeking to extricate itself 
from the provisions establishing a maximum allowable prison 
population, requiring the non-admission of detainees, and 
requiring the release of detainees.  The district court postponed 
the hearing date on several occasions, and finally dismissed the 
  
Motion to Modify "as a sanction for . . . contempt."  In its 
explanatory opinion of November 17, l993, the district court 
stated that the Motion to Modify "is dependent upon the very 
documents the City has failed to submit," that the City 
defendants "have refused and continue to refuse to pay the 
penalties provided for by the Consent Decree and ordered by this 
court, so there is no reason to believe monetary penalties would 
be an appropriate sanction," and that "[d]ismissal of the Motion 
to Modify is necessary to punish the City's defiance and prevent 
prejudice to the plaintiff class."  Addenda to City's Brief at A 
-50 (emphasis added).  
  The City contends that the court's dismissal of 
the Motion to Modify was an inappropriate sanction for a  
civil contempt order.  The City's argument finds support         
in the Supreme Court's recent decision of International Union, 
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994), where the 
Court reiterated the distinction between sanctions for civil and 
criminal contempt.  In that case, the Court identified two 
purposes for civil contempt: one coercive and the other 
compensatory.  Id. at 2558 (citing United States v. United Mine 
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947)).16  The Court cited as the 
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  With respect to the "compensatory" purpose of civil       
contempt, the Bagwell Court reaffirmed the "longstanding 
authority" of judges "to enter broad compensatory awards for all 
contempts through civil proceedings." Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 
2563; see also Roe, 919 F.2d at 868 ("The purpose of civil 
contempt is primarily remedial and is to benefit the 
complainant.") (citing Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) 
  
paradigmatic civil contempt order one that allows the contemnor 
to purge the contempt by committing an affirmative act and who 
thus, as it were, "'carries the keys of his prison in his own 
pocket.'"  Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2558 (quoting Gompers v. Bucks 
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)); see also Penfield 
Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947).   
     In holding that coercive sanctions must be capable 
of being purged to be civil and to be within the court's inherent 
authority, Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2557 (observing that civil 
fines like coercive imprisonment "exert a constant coercive 
pressure, and once the jural command is obeyed, the future, 
indefinite, daily fines are purged"), the Court reiterated a 
long-standing requirement of civil contempt.  See Penfield, 330 
U.S. at 590 (citing In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 
1902)); see also United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304-05 (fixed 
fines may be considered capable of being purged when imposed and 
suspended pending future compliance); Shillitani v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966) (civil contempt is imposed 
for remedial purpose if court conditions release from 
imprisonment upon contemnor's willingness to testify).      
(..continued) 
and Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1343 
(3d Cir. 1976)).  Even when the sanctions coerce, they aid the 
complainant by ensuring that the contemnor adheres to the court's 
order.  See Roe, 919 F.2d at 868; see also Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 
2557. 
  
  
  To the extent that "a sanction operates whether or not 
a party remains in violation of the court order, it obviously 
does not coerce any compliance."  In re Magwood, 785 F.2d 1077, 
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2960, at 585 (1973).  If the 
contemnor cannot purge through an affirmative act, the sanction 
has no coercive effect and exceeds the appropriate bounds of 
civil contempt.    
 The Court explained that because "civil contempt 
sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future 
compliance with a court order, are considered to be coercive and 
avoidable through obedience," they may be imposed in an ordinary 
civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard, and 
require neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2557.  Criminal contempt sanctions, by way 
of contrast, are punitive and vindicate the authority of the 
court by punishing past acts of disobedience.  See id. at 2557-
58; see also Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631; Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 368-
70 & n.5); United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 302; Roe, 919 F.2d at 
868.  In such cases, a jury is required.   
 The Court in Bagwell was presented with the question of 
the appropriateness of contempt fines of $52 million for 
widespread and ongoing violations of a labor injunction, payable 
to the general fisc.  In reversing the state court judgment, the 
Court held the fines were criminal in nature because petitioners 
  
had no opportunity to purge the fines once they were imposed.  
See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2562.  Therefore, sanction was 
improper because it had been imposed without the procedural 
protections that accompany a finding of criminal contempt, 
including foremost a jury trial. 
   Whether a contempt is "civil" or "criminal" depends 
upon the "'character and purpose' of the sanction involved."  Id. 
at 2557 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441).  With these general 
principles to inform us, we examine the City's challenge to the 
appropriateness of the district court's dismissal of the City's 
Motion to Modify as an inappropriate sanction for civil contempt.  
Patently, that sanction was not compensatory.  Nor was it 
designed to have a coercive effect impelling the City to submit 
at long last the tardy Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan, 
because it had no provision explicitly permitting the City to 
refile the motion once the documents were submitted.  Although it 
is arguable that because the Order did not specify that the 
dismissal was with prejudice the City may have refiled the motion 
after it complied with the submission of the documents, and thus 
we should regard it as a coercive civil contempt order, that 
argument is belied by the district court's own language.  It 
stated that "the dismissal of the Motion to Modify is based upon 
a finding of contempt," and that it was dismissing the motion "to 
punish the City[ ]."  We see no reason not to take the court at 
its own words. 
  
 We could not sustain the dismissal of the Motion to 
Modify as a sanction for criminal contempt, because it is evident 
that the requisite procedural protections, in particular a jury 
trial, were not accorded.  Like the fines at issue in Bagwell, 
the conduct cannot be termed to be petty contempt, which like 
other petty criminal offenses may be tried without a jury.  114 
S. Ct. at 2562 n.5.  "Under such circumstances, disinterested 
factfinding and even-handed adjudication were essential, and 
petitioners were entitled to a criminal jury trial."  Id. at 
2562.  Thus, although we see no reason to relieve the City of the 
court's finding that it was in contempt, we cannot uphold the 
court's imposition of the dismissal of the Motion to Modify as a 
sanction for that civil contempt. 
3.  Dismissal of Motion to Modify as a Discovery Sanction 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) authorizes a district court 
either in lieu of or in addition to one of the listed sanctions, 
including striking pleadings, to enter an order treating as 
contempt of court the failure of the party to obey any court 
order.17  In Bagwell, the Court also recognized that "[c]ourts 
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 The original Notes of the Advisory committee to the 1937 
Adoption of Rule 37 state: 
 
  The provisions of this rule authorizing 
orders establishing facts or excluding 
evidence or striking pleadings, or 
authorizing judgments of dismissal or 
default, for refusal to answer questions or 
permit inspection or otherwise make 
discovery, are in accord with Hammond Packing 
Co. v. Arkansas, l909, 29 S.Ct. 370, 212 U.S. 
322, 53 L.Ed. 530, 15  Ann.Cas. 645, which 
  
traditionally have broad authority through means other than 
contempt -- such as by striking pleadings, assessing costs, 
excluding evidence, and entering default judgment -- to penalize 
a party's failure to comply with the rules of conduct  governing 
the litigation process."  114 S. Ct. at 2560 (emphasis added). 
 In entering its order dismissing the Motion to Modify, 
the district court also stated it was informed by the standard 
stemming from Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 
863 (3d Cir. 1984), for dismissing an entire case as sanction.18  
(..continued) 
distinguishes between the justifiable use of 
such measures as a means of compelling the 
production of evidence, and their 
unjustifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliott, 
1897, 17 S.Ct. 841, 167 U.S. 409, 42 L.Ed. 
215, for the mere purpose of punishing for 
contempt. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note (1937). 
 
 
 
 
      
18
 In Poulis we identified six factors to consider in 
levying the sanction of dismissal of an action for failure to 
obey discovery schedules, failure to prosecute, or to comply with 
other procedural rules: (1) the extent of the party's personal 
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the 
failure to meet scheduling orders and to respond to discovery; 
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the 
party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the 
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an 
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of 
the claim or defense.  747 F.2d at 868.  The Poulis court 
emphasized that dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic 
sanctions, termed "extreme" by the Supreme Court, see National 
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 
643 (1975), and are to be reserved for cases comparable to the 
"flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" exhibited in 
  
It is therefore incumbent upon us to consider whether dismissal 
of the Motion to Modify was within the district court's 
discretion as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery. 
  We have affirmed dismissal of an action as a sanction 
for extreme abuses of discovery or other procedural rules or for 
failure to prosecute.  See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & 
Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992) (default judgment under 
Rule 55 for failure to defend suit); Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 
1369, 1373-75 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissal appropriate under Rules 
16, 37 and 41(b) for persistent failure to file a pretrial 
statement); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. International 
Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 691-96 (3d Cir. 1988) (dismissal 
as a Rule 37 sanction for failing to comply with discovery orders 
over extended period); Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 918 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) 
and inherent power of the court). 
  The City argues that implicit in Poulis is the 
requirement that there be a relationship between the party's 
default and the pleading being dismissed.  Such a requirement was 
referred to in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des 
Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).  Although the Court held that the 
district court in that case had not abused its discretion in 
treating personal jurisdiction over defendants as established, 
(..continued) 
National Hockey League.  See National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 
643. 
  
absent proof to the contrary, because the defendants had failed 
repeatedly to comply with discovery orders on that issue, the 
Court stated that a district court's broad discretion to impose 
discovery sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) is limited by two 
standards: 
 First, any sanction must be "just"; second, the 
    sanction must be specifically related to the  
 particular "claim" which was at issue in the 
 order to provide discovery. 
 
Id. at 707 (emphasis added).  The Court noted that the latter 
requirement embodies the due process limits that it had held 
seven decades earlier apply to striking pleadings for failure to 
comply with a discovery order.  Id. (citing Hammond Packing Co. 
v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909)).19    
 We have also recently employed the "related" 
requirement in evaluating sanctions imposed pursuant to Tax Court 
Rule 104(c).  See Estate of Spear v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 
41 F.3d 103, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1994).  Even more important, in 
Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 754 F.2d 120 (3d 
Cir. 1985), another case in which the local government 
persistently failed to comply with maximum population limits for 
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  In an older case, Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), 
the Court held that an answer to a complaint may not be struck as 
a sanction for contempt.  In its most recent discussion of this 
case in Insurance Corp., the Court reconciled the discovery 
sanctions permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
with the due process requirement of Hovey, stating that when Rule 
37(b)(2) is properly applied, it is consistent with due process.  
Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 706. 
  
inmates at a county jail, we overturned the court's imposition of 
a sanction of $5,000 for each prisoner who had to be released to 
comply with that maximum, because, inter alia, "[t]here is no 
discernable connection between the sanction and any of the 
remedial features of the injunction in place."  Id. at 129.  We 
held that the direction to pay $5,000 per released inmate "lacked 
a sufficiently specific nexus with the underlying violations and 
their correction so as to amount to an abuse of discretion."  Id. 
at 130. 
 Thus, absent the type of flagrant discovery violation 
that we have held supports dismissal of an entire suit or 
imposition of default judgment, we agree with the City that some 
nexus must be found between the district court's dismissal of the 
Motion to Modify and the City's failure to timely submit the 
Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan.   
 In order to establish such a nexus in this case, the 
district court found that "the Motion to Modify is dependent upon 
the very documents the City has failed to submit," Addenda to 
City's Brief at A-50, and that the pendency of the motion "has 
permitted the City to rationalize its noncompliance with certain 
aspects of the Consent Decree on the hopeful assumption that a 
modification was possible and forthcoming."  Id. at A-52.  We 
find the purported relationship tenuous.  The Motion to Modify 
did not seek to relieve the City of the obligation to undertake 
the Prison Planning Process which was the plan to which the 
  
Facilities Audit and the Ten-Year Plan were directed.  Thus it is 
difficult to see how noncompliance with the deadlines could have 
relieved the City of its obligations under the Prison Planning 
Process. 
 Nor are we convinced that there were no other available 
sanctions more specifically related to the Motion to Modify.  The 
district court could have continued to delay the hearing on the 
Motion to Modify until submission of the documents, which would 
have obviated any advantage to the City from its delay in 
submitting the documents and would have relieved the prejudice to 
plaintiffs, if any, referred to by the district court if they had 
been required to proceed with the hearing on the Motion to Modify 
without access to the information relied upon by the City in its 
proposed findings of fact.  The court also could have precluded 
the City from relying upon the information prepared by the City's 
consultants in the draft Audit as the basis for its proposed 
findings in support of the Motion to Modify.  Finally, the court 
could have continued to assess the stipulated monetary penalty 
for each day of noncompliance.  Although the court believed that 
that sanction was not effective because the City had failed to  
pay in light of its appeal of the October 5 Order, that penalty 
continued to accumulate and accrue.   
 Thus, we conclude that because of the absence of a more 
decided nexus between the delay in submission of the documents 
and the Motion to Modify, we cannot affirm dismissal of the 
  
Motion to Modify as a sanction for the City's delay and will thus 
reverse that portion of the Order of November 1, l993 and remand 
that issue to the district court.  In doing so, we note that 
throughout our review of the extensive record in these and the 
related appeals, we have been impressed with the dedication and 
perseverance of the district judge notwithstanding the City's 
repeated evasion of responsibilities that it voluntarily 
fashioned and undertook more than eight years ago.  The district 
judge's frustration with the City's repeated failure to submit 
the two documents when promised was justifiable.   
 It is precisely because of the long period of time  
this matter has proceeded and the important interests that are at 
stake that the the district court may wish to consider the merits 
of the Motion to Modify the Consent Decrees.  We have been 
instructed that decrees of this sort are "not intended to operate 
in perpetuity."  Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 
(1991).  In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 
748 (1992), the Court stated that because consent decrees in 
institutional reform litigation often remain in place for 
extended periods of time, "the likelihood of significant changes 
occurring during the life of the decree is increased."  Id. at 
758 (citing with approval Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org., 602 
F.2d at 1119-21). 
 In this case, the brief filed by the United States as 
amicus curiae on appeal makes arguments that we believe merit 
  
consideration.  It states, for example, not only that the United 
States believes "that a local jurisdiction subject to a consent 
decree governing its prison system has a duty, enforceable by 
appropriate means including contempt sanctions, to respect the 
terms of that decree," but also that "if the local jurisdiction 
makes a sufficient showing that the decree is having an 
unforeseen, adverse impact on law enforcement and public safety, 
the court that entered the decree has a duty to consider 
appropriate modifications."  Brief of United States at 3.  The 
United States notes that the City's Motion to Modify alleges that 
the decrees are having an unforeseen, adverse impact on law 
enforcement and public safety.  We agree that these are issues of 
public importance that deserve consideration by the district 
court. 
 The City's Motion also would have offered the district 
court an opportunity to assess its role in supervising the 
methods used by the City to comply with its obligation to reduce 
overcrowding in the Philadelphia prison system.  See Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (referring to "inherent 
limitation upon federal judicial authority" in fashioning decrees 
designed to correct constitutional violations). 
 Finally, we note that had the district court considered 
the merits of the Motion to Modify, some of the issues which have 
arisen as a result of the parties' differing interpretations as 
to the release mechanism which is the subject of our opinion in 
  
Harris VII, being filed contemporaneously with this opinion, 
could have been avoided. 
 We offer no comment on the merits of the Motion to 
Modify but merely note that, in light of the passage of time and 
the possibility of relevant changes, a reexamination does not 
seem inappropriate.  Although the district court stated in its 
November 17 Memorandum Opinion that it was not sure that the City 
could "prove changed circumstances," we do not regard that as the 
court's final determination on the merits of the Motion to 
Modify.  Our prior ruling that the meritoriousness of the claim, 
one of the Poulis factors, "must be evaluated on the basis of the 
facial validity of the pleadings, and not on summary judgment 
standards" in considering dismissal as a sanction, Scarborough v. 
Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir. 1984), seems equally 
applicable here.   
 We do not suggest that upon remand the district court 
is obliged to hold an immediate hearing.  Indeed, on the state of 
this record the purpose of such a hearing is unclear, in light of 
the pendency before the district court of a more recent Motion to 
Modify filed by the City.  In response to our inquiry as to 
whether the court's consideration of the later Motion makes moot 
our consideration of this part of the appeal, all parties assured 
us that it does not.  We have no reason to hold otherwise, 
particularly in light of the possibility that the dismissal of 
  
the Motion to Modify, should it remain intact, might influence 
subsequent proceedings. 
 For these reasons, we will reverse the portion of the 
Order of November 1, l993 dismissing the Motion to Modify as a 
sanction and remand for further proceedings.  We do not preclude 
the district court from imposing a different appropriate 
sanction. 
                                IV.                        
                            CONCLUSION   
 To recapitulate in No. 93-1997, we will affirm the 
order of the district court of October 5, 1993 assessing $584,000 
in stipulated penalties against the City of Philadelphia, and do 
not reach the question as to any additional penalties that may 
have accrued to this time.  We will dismiss as moot the appeal in 
No. 93-2116, from the order of October 28, 1993 directing 
production of the Facilities Audit.  Finally, in No. 93-2117 we 
will affirm so much of the order of November 1, 1993 as declared 
the City in contempt but will reverse that portion of the order 
that dismissed the City's Motion to Modify as a sanction.  We  
  
will remand for such further proceedings as are consistent with 
this opinion. 
_____________________________ 
 
